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Centralised or Decentralised? 
Strategic Implications of Resource Allocation Models 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the strategic implications of resource allocation models (RAMs). Four 
interrelated aspects of resource allocation are discussed; degree of centralisation, locus of strategic 
direction, cross-subsidy, and locus of control. The paper begins with a theoretical overview of these 
concepts, locating the study in both the strategic management literature and the university context. 
The concepts are then examined empirically, drawing upon a longitudinal study of three UK 
universities, Warwick, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and Oxford 
Brookes
i
. Findings suggest that RAMs are historically and culturally situated within the context of 
each university and this is associated with different patterns of strategic direction and forms of 
strategic control. As such, the RAM in use may be less a matter of best practice than one of internal 
fit. The paper concludes with some implications for theory and practice by discussing the potential 
trajectories of each type of RAM. 
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Centralised or Decentralised? 
Strategic Implications of Resource Allocation Models 
 
Introduction 
Resource allocation models are important management tools for implementing strategy (Campbell and 
Goold, 1988; Hackman, 1985). They may not be considered in isolation, being intrinsically related to 
the strategic directions an organisation takes and the monitoring and control of such directions 
(Garvin, 1998; Grant, 1988). Through the allocation of resources, some strategic directions are 
followed to the detriment of others. Resource allocation also provides an important mechanism for 
compliance and control in organisations (Hackman, 1985; Hardy, 1996). Such procedurally rational 
concepts of strategy process may seem incompatible with prevailing views of universities as 
professional bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1979), loosely coupled systems (Weick, 1976), or even 
organised anarchies (Cohen and March, 1974). However, with increasing competition for scarce 
resources in the public sector at large and universities in particular (Johnes and Cave, 1994; Le Grand, 
1991; Curran, 2000), university cultures are in transition from the traditional collegium to more 
entrepreneurial and corporate forms of organisation (Clark, 1998; Ferlie et al, 1996; McNay, 1995; 
Sporn, 1999). Increasing accountability through external audit and quality control mechanisms places 
responsibility upon universities to show transparent and ostensibly rational resource allocation 
procedures (cf. HUMANE Reports, 2000). Therefore, RAMs are a relevant topic of investigation in 
universities with implications for theory and practice. 
 
Theoretical Background 
Centralised and decentralised are common concepts dealing with the relationship between the 
corporate centre and the organisational divisions (cf. Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Campbell et al, 1995; 
Goold and Campbell, 2000). In universities these concepts focus upon the relationship between senior 
management and budget centres that are primarily academic departments, since these deliver the core 
business of teaching and research although some administrative divisions are also maintained as 
budget centres. The degree of centralisation or decentralisation, particularly in relation to strategic 
decision-making, is a relevant issue in higher education research (cf. El Khawas, 1995; Goedegebuure 
and de Boer, 1996; Thys-Clement and Wilkin, 1998). Essentially, more decentralisation may be 
expected if the university is perceived as pluralistic and loosely coupled with a portfolio of 
autonomous departments. Greater centralisation is associated with a view of the university as an 
overarching carapace of core competences and identity, under which a set of synergistic departments 
are managed (Goold, 1991; Goold and Campbell, 2000; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).  
 
The increasingly competitive higher education environment holds implications for the degree of 
centralisation of RAMs. Competitive environments have been shown to increase the use of 
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management controls, such as resource allocation, as a means of increasing coordination, monitoring 
quality, and reducing costs (Khandwalla, 1972; 1973). This is particularly the case in decentralised or 
pluralistic organisations, where management controls improve standardisation and create a unitary 
image (Khandwalla, 1972; 1973; Mintzberg, 1979). As universities are under increasing competitive 
pressure, they are exposed to changes in the way they manage internal performance (Curran, 2000; 
Deem and Johnson, 1999; Shattock, 1999) including the rising use of management controls (Ferlie et 
al, 1996; McNay, 1995). Such changes may predispose universities to a form of McDonaldisation 
(Parker and Jary, 1995), in which they undertake more centrally managed and accountable forms of 
control, even where academic decision-making is still left at the departmental level (McNay, 1995). 
For example, efficiency gains managed through recharging and progressive reductions in resources 
across the university are a means of controlling university-wide expenditure. Rather than absolutes of 
centralisation and decentralisation, it is probable that there will be increasing tensions between these 
polarities in the management of universities.  Furthermore, since universities are not a homogenous 
type in terms of history, structure or purpose, the management of RAM may be different in different 
institutions (cf. Deem and Johnson, 1999; Miller, 1995). 
 
The degree of centralisation and decentralisation of resource allocation has specific strategic 
implications related to strategic direction and locus of control. A centralised RAM is defined in this 
study as one in which resources are authorised and allocated by the senior management team from a 
central pool on a zero-sum basis. This method of resource allocation permits senior management to 
redeploy resources in accordance with strategic priorities at the corporate or overarching university 
level. Decentralised resource allocation is defined as departmental control over budgets, with 
responsibility for their own strategic direction, income-generation and financial viability. In such a 
model, departments are able to be locally responsive to strategic initiatives within their discipline and 
to generate, deploy and allocate their own income streams. These two models are theoretical polarities 
and it is likely that most universities, similar to other businesses, will operate in between the extremes. 
 
Indicators Centralised Decentralised 
Strategic Directions  Longer-term strategies 
 Higher overarching strategic 
direction 
 Existing strengths 
 Higher departmental strategic 
responsiveness 
Cross-Subsidy  Greater cross-subsidy  Lower cross-subsidy 
Locus of Control  At the centre 
 Bids for central resources 
 Departmental Heads 
 Budgetary performance indicators 
 
Table 1: Strategic implications of centralised or decentralised RAM 
 
Table 1 is a comparison of the potential implications of centralised or decentralised RAMs in terms of 
strategic direction, cross-subsidy, and locus of control. Centralised RAMs may be associated with 
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longer-term strategic goal setting because resources may be deployed to invest in potential growth 
opportunities, with risk hedged by the resources generated through the other components of the 
business (Campbell and Goold, 1988; Hedley, 1988; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). For example a 
university may choose to invest in a new discipline such as a medical school on the premise that it 
will be self-supporting or generate surplus in the long term. A significant and new resource intensive 
exercise of this nature would be less likely to emerge in a totally decentralised model. Cross-
subsidisation of less viable activities is also possible in a centralised model if these are perceived as 
important to the reputation or overall composition of the university. For example, while some 
humanities and social science disciplines may be currently less financially viable than their business 
and natural science counterparts, they may be considered to serve a longer-term social benefit that is 
important to the reputation of a university. Centralised RAMs are, however, also associated with 
lower departmental autonomy and potentially less departmental responsiveness to strategic initiatives 
within their disciplinary environment. This is because the locus of control is at the centre, with 
departmental bidding for resources used as a means of strategic control over performance (Campbell 
and Goold, 1988). While consistent with the notion of a synergistic organisation with overarching 
strategies, such a model is potentially conflictual with traditional notions of collegiality that prize 
autonomy (cf. Johnson, 2000; McNay, 1995; Miller, 1995). 
 
By contrast, decentralised RAM has the potential to favour the current areas of strength since these 
areas are self-sustaining and attract resources. In this way an institution may build centres of 
excellence based upon meritocratic performance. Those departments that perform well attract the 
resources to continue to grow whereas less viable departments have insufficient resources to reinvest, 
either performing at a sub-optimal level or being forced to close, similar to failure and divestment in a 
strategic business unit (cf. Goold, 1991; Campbell and Goold, 1988; Hedley, 1988). As such, 
overarching university strategy and cross-subsidisation are lower in this form of RAM. However, 
departmental responsiveness, autonomy and responsibility are higher since there is a direct correlation 
between departmental performance and resources. In such systems, the locus of control over budgets 
is with departmental heads. However, the centre still has a need to maintain financial control and this 
is usually reliant upon budgetary performance indicators (Campbell and Goold, 1988; Khandwalla, 
1972; 1973). In terms of autonomy, a decentralised RAM may be more congruent with traditional 
expressions of collegiality and university management (cf. Johnson, 2000; Miller, 1995). 
 
This paper examines the identified strategic implications of RAMs, degree of centralisation, strategic 
direction, cross-subsidy, and locus of control within the context of wider university strategy 
processes. The paper is based upon an empirical study of senior management in action at three UK 
universities; Warwick, Oxford Brookes and LSE. While not the only strategic actors, senior 
management for reasons of formal position and access to power and resources may be identified as 
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important to strategic action (Child, 1997; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick and Mason, 
1984; Pettigrew, 1992; Whittington, 1989; 1992). This paper thus takes a senior management 
perspective, gathering data at that level. Senior management are identified as Vice-Chancellor, Pro-
Vice-Chancellors, Registrar and Finance Officer or their institutional equivalents, as well as other 
senior academics or administrators that are pertinent to the individual context.  
 
Research Design 
Theoretical sampling criteria guided the selection of individual cases on the basis of apparent 
contextual difference in history, origin and market position (cf. Yin, 1994). While not constituting in 
all respects “polar types” (Pettigrew, 1990), the three contextually distinctive cases, Warwick, LSE, 
and Oxford Brookes were seen as appropriate to addressing the topic (see Table 2).  
 
Characteristics Warwick LSE Oxford Brookes 
Date established 1960s Late 1800s Polytechnic: 1970s 
University: 1992 
Type1 Campus Civics, Redbricks, Federal New 
Market position/ 
Academic reputation 
Top 10 University 
Research-led institution 
Top 10 University 
Research-led institution 
Top new University 
Teaching-led institution 
Total income, 
1996/97, £,0002 
138,706 73,783 65,208 
Student numbers 
1997/983 
11,947 8,311 10,181 
 
Table 2: Demographic characteristics of sites 
 
Longitudinal in-depth case studies were conducted at each site over a seven-year period, 1992 to 1998 
inclusive, six years of retrospective and one year of real-time data collection. Data were collected 
from five main sources; interviews, observation, ethnographic data, documents, and archival data (see 
Appendix A). These sources were designed to counteract the bias potentially resulting from relying 
upon a single data source (Denzin, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989), particularly where retrospective analysis 
is involved (Golden, 1992). Multiple sources also furnish the breadth of information needed to 
develop a relatively holistic picture of strategy processes within context (Jick, 1979; Pettigrew, 1990).  
 
A total of 49 open-ended interviews were held with all current senior management and, where they 
were identified as pertinent to specific strategic actions studied, some former senior management and 
other academic and administrative staff. Interviews lasted, typically, 90 minutes, of which 44 were 
audio-taped, the remaining five being reconstructed within 24 hours from detailed notes (cf. 
Eisenhardt, 1989). While uniform prompts were used to ensure consistency, open-ended interviews 
                                                 
1
 Type refers to the 5-category typology used for site selection: 1. Ancients; 2. Civics, Redbricks and Federal; 3. 
Campus; 4. New; and 5. Technological (O‟Leary, 1997). 
2
 Source: HESA statistics, May, 1998. 
3
 Source: HESA statistics, September, 1999. 
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were important for the interpretative approach taken. Participants were able to “engage in a stream of 
consciousness” (Gioia and Thomas, 1996:374), reflecting upon the aspects of strategy process they 
perceived as important (cf. Langley, 1989; 1990). Interviews investigated both retrospective and 
current strategic actions and processes. 
 
Serial observations of 51 strategic level meetings across the cases, averaging approximately two hours 
per meeting, were observed throughout the year of real-time data collection. Sustained observation 
enabled the identification of ongoing patterns of action and the meanings associated with those 
patterns (Barley, 1995). Background that enhanced the interpretation of observations was accessible 
through committee minutes, interviews, and informal discussion with participants. 
 
Data of an ethnographic nature were collected to achieve greater familiarity with locally meaningful 
informal processes and routines (Van Maanen, 1979). Pre- and post-meeting observations provided an 
opportunity for observation, as did other general on-site interactions. Additionally, the senior Pro-
Vice-Chancellor (PVC) at Warwick and the senior Deputy-Vice-Chancellor (DVC) at Oxford 
Brookes were shadowed for one week each. Given the time constraints of the research, a week 
enabled greater familiarity with practices and informal interactions at the top team level (cf. 
Mintzberg, 1973). At LSE shadowing was not undertaken as the fieldwork on that site involved whole 
day visits to the Planning Office in the senior management wing, next to the communal coffee 
machine visited by all senior management and their support staff. As trust grew, ethnographic data 
became available through informal discussion, eavesdropping and observation. 
 
Minute books from key strategic committees for the period 1992 to 1997 inclusive were the principal 
source of archival data. These were supported by other documents such as annual reports, annual 
accounts, academic databases, strategic plans, audit documents, and university calendars. Such data 
were used to anchor and inform the data collection process, developing extensive processual analyses 
of strategic activities, both for reconstructed events and to complement real-time data with antecedent 
material (Golden, 1992).  
 
The above data sources resulted in a rich qualitative data set which was subjected to a thematic 
analysis, progressively moving from very broad categories to key themes and constructs (Miles and 
Hubermann, 1994). Data were coded using Nud*ist, a software package that enables complex, 
multiple coding of mass qualitative data (Richards and Richards, 1994). As themes emerged, 
preliminary findings were examined in light of the existing literature in order to guide further analysis 
(Orton, 1997; Pettigrew, 1997). This resulted in some changes to the coding trees or the re-coding of 
some data. Through this iterative process, the 4,521 coded data items were arranged on a coding tree 
Jarzabkowski, P. 2002. "Centralised or decentralised? The strategic implications of resource allocation models." 
Higher Education Quarterly, 56.1:5-32. 
 7 
with four main branches related to senior management, organisational context, strategy processes such 
as RAM, and the strategic actions of the institutions.  
 
The possibility of both researcher and informant bias was recognised. Therefore, three techniques 
were used; triangulation, inter-coder reliability checks, and validation from participants. Triangulation 
avoids the potential bias of a single data source and assists in constructing more complete and 
accurate analyses through converging sources of evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jick, 1979; Yin, 1994). 
Inter-coder reliability checks were performed to confirm the consistency of the coding schema (Fox-
Wolfgramm, 1997). The coding tree and construct definitions were explained to two doctoral students 
who were unfamiliar with the data. A data sample retrieved directly from the Nud*ist files and in no 
way altered from that used by the investigator was then given to the two co-analysts. The sample 
comprised 10% of the complete data set and covered constructs and issues from each branch of the 
coding tree and each data source. Upon evaluation, coding in the sample was found to be between 
97% and 100% reliable from both co-analysts. The high consistency of this evaluation and the typical 
nature of the data examined helped to verify the reliability and robustness of the analysis. Finally, 
results of the analysis were fed back to senior management participants in order to help validate the 
findings. The progressive nature of this reporting enabled informants to contribute to the process of 
refining coding into key themes. A combination of strongly triangulated data, inter-coder reliability 
checks, and validation from participants significantly limited the possibility of researcher bias. 
 
Data and Preliminary Analysis 
 
Case 1: Warwick University 
Warwick is a research-led university that has a reputation for entrepreneurial activity because of its 
capacity to generate up to 65% of gross income from commercial sources (Clark, 1998). This 
perception is widely reflected in the senior management; “There is a lot of shared understanding 
between members of the team in terms of the entrepreneurial culture and the innovative culture” 
(PVC). 
 
Strategic directions 
An analysis of strategic actions from 1992 to 1998 show that Warwick has consistently pursued goal-
oriented actions related to research excellence, income-generation, capital expansion and growth of 
the Science Faculty. Research actions undertaken were: responses to the 1992 and 1996 Research 
Assessment Exercises (RAE); the 1994 Warwick Research Fellows‟ initiative to grow the research 
community; and action from 1994/95 onwards to stimulate greater performance in research grant and 
contract income. There was rapid expansion of capital works in the earlier phase of this study, 
stabilising from 1996 onwards as the operating surplus became more constrained. At this time the 
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focus on income-generating activities, always strong, increased. Growth of the Science Faculty was 
incorporated into the other strategic directions through attraction of key research staff, capital 
infrastructure, and targeted student growth in the relevant disciplines. This is further complemented 
by the recent decision to develop a medical school. Thus, while a number of exogenous and 
endogenous factors have been influential, strategic directions have remained consistent throughout the 
period of analysis.  
 
Resource allocation procedures 
There are three main strategic committees, the Strategy Committee, Estimates and Grants Committee 
(E&G), and Earned Income Group (EIG) that are responsible for strategic planning, financial 
decision-making, income generation, resource allocation, and monitoring and control (see Table 3). 
As they have overlapping senior management membership and are chaired by the VC, the Senior 
PVC, and the Registrar respectively, they enable strong central control and coordination of strategic 
actions.  
 
Committee Function 
Strategy 
Committee 
 Develops the financial plan 
 Makes strategic decisions relating to growth, development, and resource allocation 
 Considers action plans  
 Monitors implementation and performance in the main areas of University strategic action 
Earned 
Income Group 
(EIG) 
 Manages and monitors all non-state grant sources of income, known as earned income 
activities comprising some 65% of gross income. 
 EIG conducts quarterly monitoring of the four categories of activity: academic-driven; spin-
off; stand-alone; and self-financing and conducts an annual „Challenge‟ review. 
Estimates and 
Grants (E&G) 
 
 A centralised system of resource allocation interacting directly with academic departments 
using a „zero-based‟ model whereby departments must apply for the filling of vacant posts 
with resources transferable according to central priorities. 
 Traditionally, where posts are granted, the position reverts to a junior post, acting as a 
savings device and, indirectly, a source of embedding cultural values. 
 Shapes the University by implementing growth, retrenchment and efficiency gains. 
 
Table 3: Function of strategic committees at Warwick University 
 
Resources are maintained in a central pool that is distributed through Strategy Committee as part of 
the annual financial planning process. During the financial planning process, resources are allocated 
in accordance with overarching University priorities. For example, developments in capital 
infrastructure are allocated to some departments and activities over others because they favour the 
growth strategies of the University. Strategy Committee is supported by E&G for academic resource 
allocation and EIG for income generation. Resource allocation through E&G is, in principle, zero-sum 
based, being used to shape organisational growth and retrenchment according to senior management 
prioritisation of departmental needs (see Table 3). When a post falls vacant the relevant Head of 
Department makes a written application to E&G for resources to refill the post, followed by an 
interview with the committee, in which the validity of the bid against departmental performance and 
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University priorities are considered. If a replacement post is granted, there is no expectation that this 
will be at the same level. It is customary that a new post will be at a junior level, entailing a lower 
resource commitment, unless the Department can make a convincing case for a higher position.   
While not a resource allocation committee, EIG is relevant because it manages all income generating 
activities including academic areas of revenue such as full fee paying courses and research grant and 
contract income (see Table 3). Profits generated through EIG activities contribute to a central resource 
pool that is allocated in accordance with top team priorities. EIG reviews quarterly accounts of 
activities and conducts annual „Challenge‟ meetings to monitor the performance of activities against 
trends and forecasts (see Table 3); “The business just has to be able to bulk up the better income 
streams and minimise or curtail less productive ones” (Finance Officer). Profit-sharing mechanisms 
between the centre and departments, including a “super surplus” retained by high income generating 
departments are an incentive that reinforces a culture of entrepreneurialism. Top slicing of profits 
enables senior management to finance strategic initiatives and cross-subsidise departments with lower 
income-generating capacity.  
 
Locus of control 
The centralised nature of these key committees provides the centre with a mechanism for acting 
strategically at the overarching University level in matters of resource allocation. This is 
complemented by a localised routine of interaction involving direct communication between the 
centre and the departments;  
 
I have talked with the Chair of [a department] about the way we arrange their package of 
resources. It is a central group striking an agreement with the Department as to how things 
will operate. (PVC, Chair of E&G).  
 
This pattern is referred to by the top team as the “strong centre, strong department” model of acting. 
The top team or centre is „strong‟ because of its hold over resources, income-generation, and overall 
strategic positioning of the University. Departments gain „strength‟ through strong leadership 
combined with excellent performance in research ranking and income-generation. Such departments 
maintain power in their relationships with the centre because of their capacity to command scarce 
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), whereas lesser performers are more subject to central control 
(Hackman, 1985; Hickson et al, 1971). 
 
Case 2: London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) 
LSE is a research-led social science institution with a reputation for anomie (Newby, 1997) that 
members refer to with pride, implying that there is a symbiotic relationship between academic 
autonomy and research excellence; “We recruit very good people because it is a free, non-coercive 
atmosphere which is highly conducive to research” (Pro-Director). 
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Strategic directions 
The strategic plan documents goals related to research excellence, maintaining the full range of social 
sciences, income generation, and development of capital infrastructure. However, analysis provides 
evidence of strategic drift and dissonance between espoused intent and action, particularly during the 
earlier period of this study. For example, despite a policy of zero growth, student numbers were over 
target by between 200 and 400 each year from 1994 to 1998/99, particularly in high fee-paying 
subject areas. Such drift is counter to policy, distorting the ethnic balance and social science 
composition of the School and overtaxing the capital infrastructure; “Every year we say we won‟t let 
the numbers change and we do and it‟s changing the student experiences” (Senior Academic).  
 
The collegial culture of the School is resistant to commercial activities as these are considered to 
dilute academic endeavour: “The old LSE types [are] not given to commercially induced whims or 
undermining of academic standards” (Senior Academic). It has thus been difficult to implement 
income-generating activities. However, coincident with the appointment of a new Director in 1997 a 
number of overarching strategic initiatives, documented as „Director‟s Initiatives‟, are being 
implemented; “There is no doubt that he is embarked upon a radical programme of change here” 
(Senior Administrator). For example, four School Professors have been appointed to stimulate overall 
research performance and the School has undergone a professional marketing campaign designed to 
increase visibility and enhance income generating capacity. 
 
Committees Function 
Standing 
Committee 
 Acts as a governance body, authorising, and legitimating strategic actions 
relayed to it by the top team and APRC.  
Academic 
Board 
 Collegial committee that is influential in either authorising or vetoing strategic 
actions recommended by APRC. 
Academic 
Planning and 
Resource 
Committee 
(APRC) 
Collegial body which makes recommendations to Academic Board regarding: 
 5 yearly departmental reviews, to determine their resource allocation; 
 develops and refines non-cash resource allocation formulae (MSLs and OPPP);  
 student number and fee-level planning; 
 annual resource distribution exercise for recurrent and non-recurrent resources; 
 interfacing with other strategic committees such as the Finance Committee, 
reporting to Standing Committee and receiving reports from other committees; 
 medium-term future planning of the shape and size of the University. 
Finance 
Committee 
 Determines the resources available for academic or other strategic endeavour, 
after running and maintenance costs but does not allocate these resources. 
 
Table 4: Function of major strategic committees at LSE 
 
Resource allocation procedures 
There are four main strategic committees; Standing Committee, Finance Committee, Academic 
Planning and Resource Committee (APRC), and Academic Board (see Table 4). While the Director 
chairs the latter two, there is no main strategic and financial planning committee at which the top team 
act together as the primary players. Indeed, senior management do not formally manage resource 
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allocation. Resources are authorised by the Finance Committee and allocated by APRC, a collegial 
body comprised of professorial and non-professorial staff. Recurrent resources are set for a five-
yearly term based upon APRC reviews but annual surplus may be allocated at the discretion of APRC, 
dependent upon bids for such essentially non-recurrent activities. However as it lacks any clear 
system of authority, APRC relies upon non-cash formulae to allocate resources, adopting a points 
system known as Minimum Staffing Levels (MSLs). This formula was introduced in 1992/93 in an 
attempt to shape the School‟s growth but proved inflationary in terms of staff and student numbers. It 
has been refined in 1998 into a system of Operational Pounds Per Point (OPPP) that awards points for 
income and expenditure. The OPPP is intended to better monitor resource utilisation.  
 
Cross subsidisation occurs because strong performers in research, student recruitment, and income-
generation do not receive greater tangible rewards and lesser performers are not penalised, as this 
does not accord with the notion of collegiality. However, the 1998 development and transparent 
dissemination of departments‟ performance in the OPPP are an attempt to bring accountability to the 
departmental level; “APRC feels that the more responsibility you give departments, the more 
responsible they will be in terms of how they spend” (Finance Officer). Transparency of departmental 
performance constitutes a form of “re-integrative shaming” (Senior Academic) designed to encourage 
departments, particularly lesser performers, to self-monitor their income generation and resource 
utilisation performance (cf. Johnson, 2000). This indirect method of monitoring resource allocation 
constitutes a form of controlled collegiality (Langley, 1989; 1990) that reflects the central paradox of 
power; “the power of an agency is increased in principle by that agency delegating authority” (Hardy 
and Clegg, 1996:634). 
 
Locus of control 
The RAM is indicative of a localised routine of checks and balances designed to preserve the collegial 
culture and prevent an ascendance of power in any single body of the University. However, senior 
management has greater influence over resource allocation and strategic direction than the formal 
structures indicate. Through iterative methods of interaction between committees and opinion leaders, 
senior management are able to influence resource allocation; “One has the opportunity to command 
resources but only in a way that you persuade people” (Pro-Director). Hence, during the period of 
observation, the top team managed to generate financial support for strategic actions by convincing 
interested parties of the desirability of these actions, so gradually building momentum. “You don‟t 
move things in this place by being managerial. You find champions for things and work with the grain 
of the School to secure change” (Secretary). Thus skilled management of meaning is required for the 
centre to allocate resources to overarching School objectives (cf. Hardy, 1996). “We get other people 
to think that they want what we want” (Director). This has been particularly evident in the latter part 
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of the study, where the Director appointed in 1997 has the academic credibility and networking skills 
necessary to influence resource allocation within the collegial context of LSE. 
 
Case 3: Oxford Brookes University 
A former polytechnic, Oxford Brookes is one of the leading „new‟ universities in the UK. The 
University has a reputation for teaching excellence, having pioneered modular programmes in the 
1970s, and this is reflected in a student-centred ethos; “Commitment to the students was tangible” 
(Former Senior DVC).  
 
Strategic directions 
Strategic intent and actions in the earlier part of this study were largely focussed upon financial 
viability and building capital infrastructure, whilst maintaining the teaching reputation. During this 
period the University consolidated its student funding levels at 17.5% above the sectoral average and 
purchased a new campus site. Since 1998 strategic actions have been strongly influenced by the 
HEFCE migration policy; a funding formula that resulted in a 12.5% decrease in state funding per 
student unit of resource for Oxford Brookes. This equates with a growth of 800 un-funded student 
places. In order to meet this objective, a range of strategies has been implemented involving 
partnerships with higher education colleges and industry in order to deliver education without 
increasing on-campus student numbers. These actions are broadly consistent with the history of 
innovation in teaching and learning and maintaining financial viability. They are being rapidly 
implemented to the extent that the University has met its growth targets in half the time agreed with 
HEFCE. However a new area of intent, building the research profile, is slower to progress as it 
contradicts former strategic intent; “I took the view strategically that we couldn‟t be a research 
University” (Former VC).  
 
Resource allocation procedures 
Of the four main strategic committees, Board of Governors, Vice-Chancellor‟s Advisory Group 
(VAG), Academic Board, and Strategy and Planning Committee (SPC), VAG is the most influential. 
It comprises the six-person senior management team; “It‟s really where we set the agenda. That‟s the 
core executive team and that‟s where we decide what sort of policies we are taking through; what we 
want to do” (VC). Senior Management interacts with the Board of Governors, particularly to approve 
strategic decisions, and Academic Board and its sub-committee, Strategy and Planning Committee 
(SPC) to disseminate information and comply with University governance regulations (see Table 5).  
 
As part of a progressive movement towards more formally accountable strategic and financial 
planning practices, senior management adopted a new procedure in 1995/96, the strategic planning 
cycle. This annual cycle integrates strategic direction, resource allocation, and monitoring and control 
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within a single process that is monitored by senior management at every stage. The financial and 
physical parameters of the plan are developed annually by senior management in order to prioritise 
strategic actions and set performance targets. These parameters and priorities are then disseminated to 
departments as guidelines for developing their budgets and operating plans. Once in the plan, actions 
tend to be repeated over successive years providing that they meet performance goals. 
 
Committee Function 
Board of 
Governors 
 Responsible for the administrative and management accountability of the 
institution, particularly in terms of financial audit. 
VCs Advisory 
Group (VAG) 
 Core executive body that deals with strategic and operational decisions and 
actions, including setting the parameters of the strategic plan and managing 
and monitoring the planning cycle. 
Academic Board  Formally responsible for approving the strategic plan. However, in practice, 
is mainly a forum for canvassing opinion and input on areas of „academic 
territory‟. 
Strategy and 
Planning (SPC) 
 A sub-committee of the Academic Board that is responsible for considering 
the strategic plan and making recommendations to Academic Board. 
Strategic planning 
cycle 
 The major coordinating mechanism, integrating strategic directions, 
implementation, resource allocation, monitoring and control in a single, 
annually cyclical procedure. 
 
Table 5: Function of major strategic committees at Oxford Brookes University 
 
Resources are allocated through the strategic planning cycle to the 31 schools and departments termed 
„budget centres‟. While budget centres have control of spending within their allocation, at the 
corporate level the resource allocation model emphasises financial viability, providing power over 
organisational shape and direction (cf. Campbell and Goold, 1988). “The budget model penalises 
schools because, if they don‟t recruit to target, then their budget is reduced” (DVC). For example, in 
1995/96 the planning cycle identified problems of student recruitment in a department. This was 
monitored over successive years resulting in closure in 1998/99 because of failure to meet targets. 
Each year since its inception the planning cycle implements increasingly stringent financial and 
human resource efficiency gains in order to meet the University‟s response to declining state funding. 
This is indicated in the 1998/99 planning cycle that incorporates 13 new statistical performance 
indicators in six priority areas. “The indicators drawn up emphasise those key indicators which Senior 
Management Team currently consider the most important for benchmarking performance internally 
and externally” (Planning Cycle, 1998/99). As transparency of the RAM increases, the budget centres 
seek sanctions and rewards that are tied to performance indicators. For example in the 1996/97 
planning meetings, a budget centre Head “sought University support in handling the problem of 
under-performing staff within the context of clear disciplinary procedures” (Planning cycle minutes, 
1996/97). These changes are indicative of changes in the activity system, sometimes termed “The 
Winning Approach [which] is about a whole range of activities that a school has to score well on” 
(Senior DVC). 
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As the RAM does not incorporate top-slicing, it is difficult for senior management to resource new 
initiatives from the centre. For example, it is difficult to put resources into establishing greater 
research activity; “Unless research pays, you're not going to get some Schools giving it enough 
attention” (PVC). Additionally, it is problematic to cross-subsidise lesser performers since resources 
are tied to current performance, particularly sound recruitment at undergraduate level. Thus resources 
are tied to strategic directions that are consistent with the historical areas of strength and grounded in 
the student-centred ethos. As cultural change becomes more established through the strategic planning 
cycle, issues of top-slicing and development of new goals are becoming a source of senior 
management discussion because the existing RAM was not delivering the full range of strategic 
aspirations.  
 
Further Analysis and Discussion 
This discussion will compare the case study institutions against four indicators identified in the 
theoretical framing of the paper; relative centralisation of the RAM, primary locus of strategic 
direction; cross-subsidisation of departments; and locus of control. These comparisons will then be 
located within the specific context of each case study to interpret the findings. 
 
Centralisation 
Warwick operates the most centralised RAM of the three cases. Resources are prioritised, allocated 
and monitored directly by senior management through the main strategic committees and the financial 
planning process. Top-slicing and profit-sharing provide the centre with resources to distribute in 
accordance with their priorities. By contrast, Oxford Brookes operates a centralised/decentralised 
RAM insomuch as strategic priorities and financial parameters are centralised but budgets are 
devolved to schools and departments. As there is no top-slicing, resources tend to be allocated in 
accordance with performance to financial viability targets such as recruitment. LSE has the least 
centralised RAM, with resources allocated by a collegial committee of professorial and non-
professorial staff who have limited authority, relying upon a points system to manage resource 
distribution. Even senior management is required to go through APRC in order to deploy resources 
for perceived strategic priorities.  
 
Strategic directions 
At Warwick the zero-sum model in operation permits resources to be redeployed from areas of 
strength to finance new initiatives. Strategic initiatives are prioritised, managed, and monitored 
through the central committees. For example, new areas of income generation are analysed and 
approved for their financial soundness through EIG Committee and new academic initiatives, such as 
a Medical School, are decided at Strategy Committee. There is evidence of consistency between 
strategic intent and action throughout the period of this research. The primary locus for strategic 
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directions may thus be considered to be at the centre, with a focus upon overarching strategic goals 
and resources deployed in accordance with central prioritising.  
 
The planning cycle at Oxford Brookes is an effective mechanism for establishing financial parameters 
in accordance with strategic directions, particularly those related to quantitative targets such as 
recruitment and staff numbers. Senior management are able to centrally shape organisational growth 
through allocation of resources to specific student units and retrenchment through the implementation 
of broad scale efficiency gains. The detailed nature of the planning cycle enables requests from 
schools and departments for additional resources to be centrally evaluated against strategic priorities. 
Emergent strategic directions may thus be funded if the shrinking pool of resources permits. However, 
as there is no top-slicing it is difficult to establish and finance new initiatives from the centre. 
Resources tend to favour greater commitment to areas of current strategic strength, particularly those 
related to financial viability, and this is evidenced in the rapid attainment of the HEFCE migration 
targets. While both long and short-term goals may be pursued, the RAM reinforces existing areas of 
excellence. Strategic direction is thus located both at the centre and in the RAM itself. 
 
At LSE resources are not specifically tied to strategic directions, being allocated by a collegiate body, 
the APRC. While resources are tied to student:staff ratios, the five-yearly review of resource 
allocation is too long to adequately reflect changes in organisational composition. For example, an 
undergraduate student is customarily a three-year unit of resource and taught postgraduates are one-
year units of resource. There is thus initial evidence of strategic drift in student numbers with 
consequences for capital infrastructure and social science composition of the School. Strategic 
directions that are able to emerge through the various committees and opinion leaders are liable to 
have generated sufficient support to be actioned. While directions are not centrally imposed, senior 
management may be influential if they are able to persuade the constituents of LSE of the desirability 
of strategic actions. As the current senior management team is skilled in the social processes of 
generating strategic impetus, the centre has the capacity to influence strategic direction. This is 
evidenced by the implementation of a range of new strategic initiatives at the overarching University 
level. However, strategic directions at LSE must be considered the least centrally managed of the 
three case studies. This was associated with problematic long-term goal setting in the early stages of 
this study, although this is progressively changing. 
 
Cross-subsidy 
Cross-subsidy of lower income performers occurs as a matter of policy at Warwick, with central 
resources allocated in accordance with strategic priorities. Thus some departments may receive 
greater central subsidisation in appointing academic posts or in financing new capital infrastructure 
because they are areas in which the University wishes to grow numbers or maintain and develop 
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research strength. This type of subsidisation may be associated with performance expectations for 
departments and capital developments in particular are tied to income-generating activities that are 
incorporated within the financial plan in order to monitor return on investment. LSE also cross-
subsidises departments as a matter of policy. However the degree of cross-subsidisation is loosely 
linked with performance and resources. As the resource pool has become increasingly constrained, 
this has become a matter for concern leading to collegiate measures such as transparent resource 
utilisation profiles in order to stimulate more departmental responsibility for performance. Oxford 
Brookes has the least capacity for cross-subsidisation, to the extent that a non-performing school was 
closed down due to its incapacity to remain financially viable. The lack of criteria for supporting less 
financially viable schools that are important to overall University composition is a source of concern 
for senior management as the current RAM stimulates growth in big schools while smaller ones have 
the potential to be progressively starved. However this had not been addressed at the close of the 
study.  
 
Locus of control 
The locus of control at Warwick is with the centre, afforded by the control over resource allocation. 
Consistent with models of fast growing, entrepreneurial organisations, there is a power culture located 
around a powerful centre (Handy, 1981; Mintzberg, 1979). Departmental power arises from the ability 
to command scarce resources through research or income-generating activities, increasing the 
capacity of such departments to negotiate with the centre while lesser performers lose autonomy 
(Hackman, 1985; Hickson et al, 1971). The RAM recognises this balance of power and encourages 
compliance with central directions through the profit sharing models. The locus of control may thus 
be considered to be primarily at the centre and is facilitated by direct interaction between senior 
management and departments, which focuses organisational attention on central goals (Simons, 1990; 
1994). 
 
At Oxford Brookes control resides in senior management, who establish the strategic and financial 
parameters under which budget centres perform, and in the resource allocation process itself. That is, 
once an action is within the strategic planning cycle it has resources allocated to it that will be 
perpetuated or even increased in accordance with performance indicators. Under such a RAM, it is as 
difficult to curtail a viable action as to sustain an unviable one. This form of goals/means 
displacement, in which a procedure intended to aid strategic choice begins to dictate the choices 
available, is a recognised phenomena in formal operating procedures and may persist across 
successive cycles of an organisation (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). The locus of 
control is thus in the centre and in the planning mechanisms (cf. Campbell and Goold, 1988; 
Khandwalla, 1972; 1973). 
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At LSE control is diffuse, residing in powerful departments, opinion leaders, important committees 
and skilled operators in the senior management team. In such a model control is socially negotiated, 
depending upon the centre‟s ability to manage meaning in a manner favourable to its own ends 
(Hardy, 1996; Hardy and O‟Sullivan, 1998; Lukes, 1974). While negotiation and selling are 
commonly undertaken by senior managers in order to influence the uptake of strategies (Garvin, 1998; 
Simons, 1990; 1994), the prevalence and reinforcement of the points-based RAM at LSE is evidence 
of a more diffuse locus of control. Such types of formal analysis are considered to serve the purposes 
of controlled collegiality in organisations where managers deal with a largely autonomous workforce 
of professionals (Langley, 1989; 1990). The complex information generated to administer these 
procedures may be used as a point of negotiation and persuasion, particularly in terms of moral 
persuasion engendered by the transparent dissemination of departmental allocations. Thus weakly 
sanctioned formal controls are balanced by strong normative controls that are embedded within the 
social structure of the LSE (cf. Deem and Johnson, 1999; Giddens, 1984; Johnson, 2000). Control 
may be centralised in such situations but only through a combination of skilled negotiation at the 
centre and the consensus or acquiescence of the organisation. 
 
Indicators Warwick LSE Oxford Brookes 
Relative centralisation  Most centralised  Most decentralised  De/Centralised 
Strategic direction  Central prioritising 
 Overarching 
university strategy 
 Central negotiation 
and persuasion 
 Emergent strategy 
 Central setting of 
parameters 
 Consolidation of 
current strengths 
Cross-subsidy  High   High   Lowest 
Locus of control  At the centre 
 Central resource 
pool 
 Profit-sharing 
encourages 
compliance 
 Direct interaction 
with senior 
management 
 Diffuse 
 Management of 
meaning by senior 
management 
 Normative: 
transparent 
resource allocation 
 At the centre 
 In the planning 
cycle and RAM 
 Existing strategies 
and centres of 
excellence 
maintain strength 
 
Table 6: Cross-case comparison of strategic implications of RAM 
 
Table 6 summarises this cross case comparison of relative centralisation, locus of strategic direction, 
capacity for cross-subsidy, and locus of control. The comparisons provide general support for the 
theoretical framework proposed at the beginning of this paper. Degrees of centralisation in RAM 
appear to be associated with the suggested strategic implications. Drawing upon this framework, 
Warwick is the most akin to a synergistic business with core competences that integrate the various 
departments within an overarching university strategy (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Oxford Brookes 
tends more towards the portfolio of autonomous business units, integrated through budgetary controls 
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and performance indicators (Campbell and Goold, 1988). LSE falls somewhere between these cases, 
being less compatible with business models and more akin to the loosely coupled system (Weick, 
1976), collegium (McNay, 1995), or professional bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1979) in which there is 
high autonomy but also low control.  
 
While theory deals with polarities, the actual cases display degrees of balance between the various 
indicators. These distinctions are socially embedded, being situated within the historical and cultural 
context of each institution. While such a limited sample of cases may not provide generalisations, the 
differences may be located within wider studies of organisations and other studies of university 
culture and organisation. At Warwick, a fast-growing institution with a reputation for 
entrepreneurialism, the RAM support centralised strategic direction and control (cf. Handy, 1981; 
McNay, 1995), whereas LSE is more collegial, with loosely defined and negotiable strategic direction 
and control (Cohen and March, 1974; McNay, 1995). Oxford Brookes, on the other hand, may be 
classified as more bureaucratic, consistent with its history of governance by initially a Local 
Education Authority and then a National Advisory Board (Bastin, 1990; Eustace, 1994; Robertson, 
1993). As such the RAM supports a history and culture of formalised and accountable strategic 
directions and controls (cf. Handy, 1981; McNay, 1995).  
 
Theoretical and practical implications 
Given these contextually located differences, the choice of RAM is less a matter of best practice than 
one of internal fit. It is doubtful that the RAM applicable in one case study could be transposed to 
another of the cases due to the specific characteristics of culture and context in each institution. As the 
cases are consistent with existing typologies of universities and organisations, there may, however, be 
similarities with other universities of similar background, for example other new universities may 
have similar characteristics to Oxford Brookes and campus universities to Warwick. The extent to 
which institutions of similar background are characterised by similar RAM and the strategic 
implications associated with such RAM, is a topic for further investigation over a wider sample of 
universities.  
 
Since the cases may be classified in accordance with existing models, it is possible to speculate about 
the possible trajectories of strategy process arising from each type of RAM. The notion of trajectories 
may be used to examine how existing structures, strategies, and processes, particularly where they are 
associated with success, may gain momentum in an organisation to the extent that they become 
caricatures of the initial components of success, ultimately leading to decline (Miller, 1992). While 
hypothetical, such theorising serves a useful predictive purpose as it suggests potential problems 
associated with any particular RAM.  
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Under the entrepreneurial, Warwick style model, there is a danger that RAM may lead to over-
centralisation and excessive reliance upon senior management for strategic direction. While there is a 
degree of departmental autonomy, the profit-sharing models may stimulate compliance with 
overarching directions to the detriment of departmental responsiveness and stifling of innovations that 
do not originate at or comply with central directions. Such trajectories are found in entrepreneurial 
firms as they reach „middle age‟, growing beyond the management capacity of a flat, power-based 
structure and culture (Hanks, 1990; Miller, 1992; Tashakori, 1980) and becoming predisposed to 
familiarity and maturity traps that create barriers to innovation (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). In this 
essentially centralised style of RAM it is necessary to maintain a high degree of diversity and renewal 
at the centre in order to guard against the dangers of excessive homogeneity and familiarity in the 
senior management team (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Iaquinto and 
Frederickson, 1997; Johnson, 1987). Such characteristics of senior management have been associated 
with groupthink (Janis, 1972), resistance to change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), barriers to learning 
(Bettis and Prahalad, 1995), and strategic inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Rumelt, 1995). 
Therefore, in a centralised RAM attention must be paid to senior management composition and 
organisational experimentation (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; March, 1991). 
 
The LSE model of RAM, when carried to the extremes of its trajectory, has the potential to be 
associated with organised anarchy (Cohen and March, 1974), or even more random forms of strategic 
decision-making, such as the garbage can model (Cohen et al, 1972). In such circumstances, the 
university suffers from goal ambiguity and is unable to pursue purposive directions. Rather, action 
occurs through the random confluence of problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities 
that interact fluidly.. However, in the climate of new managerialism that pervades the public sector, 
including higher education, universities are required to display ostensibly rational procedures that 
involve purposive action, accountability, and environmental responsiveness (cf. Ferlie et al, 1996). 
While there may be a gap between managerial discourses and actual practice (Prichard and Willmott, 
1997), the tendencies of a trajectory based upon traditional forms of collegiality may be counteracted 
by the application of collegially acceptable forms of control (Johnson, 2000; Langley, 1989; 1991; 
McNay, 1995). These include transparency of resource allocation, and a senior management team 
with contextual sensitivity, credibility with the academic body, and excellent negotiation skills.  
 
Finally, the trajectory of the Oxford Brookes model may be prone to excessive bureaucratisation, in 
which formalised and accountable procedures become routinised to the extent that they dictate choice 
(Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982).  In the extremes of 
this model, the institution has a tendency to adopt recurrent patterns of strategic action becoming 
trapped in the rules and routines by which the organisation is structured (Cohen et al, 1996). The 
avoidance of routinised action patterns is complex, since they are embedded within the social 
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architecture of the organisation (Henderson and Clark, 1990). However, some flexibility in the RAM 
may be facilitated through the maintenance of a central pool of funds that is not allocated to existing 
financial and strategic parameters and indicators. This discretionary fund may be used to stimulate 
innovation by resourcing activities that are on the periphery of existing, routinised action (cf. Ahuja 
and Lampert, 2001; Wenger and Snyder, 2000). 
 
While each of these trajectories is a hypothetical case, organisations are known to fall into the traps of 
excessive recourse to existing mechanisms, patterns, and behaviours (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992; Miller, 1992). Thus, the trajectories have implications for practice and also for 
theory. Future research may undertake longitudinal investigation of institutions with similar RAM to 
determine the circumstances under which RAM is associated with desirable outcomes and when it is 
prone to the negative effects of routine and over-dependence. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the strategic implications of resource allocation models in three UK 
universities, Warwick, LSE and Oxford Brookes. Comparisons have been based upon four main 
concepts, the degree of centralisation, locus of strategic direction, cross-subsidisation, and locus of 
control. The findings suggest four main conclusions. First, universities have different models of 
resource allocation in accordance with their contextual characteristics of culture, history, and 
structure. Second, these differences are manifested in a tension between centralisation and 
decentralisation, and varying degrees of balance between locus of strategic direction, cross-subsidy 
and control. As such, RAM is less a matter of best practice, neatly transferable between institutions, 
than one of internal fit. Third, all forms of RAM are inherently problematic when carried to extremes, 
therefore internal fit is, ideally, flexible to changes in the university and the wider environment. 
Finally, there appears to be substantial relevance between theory based largely on private sector, 
commercial organisations and the universities discussed here. This suggests that there is indeed 
increasing application of business terminology and concepts within the higher education sector, 
possibly associated with new public management (Ferlie et al, 1996; Parker and Jary, 1995). Further 
research is needed to understand the degree to which such terminology and concepts have direct 
correspondence in the higher education sector (cf. Deem and Johnson, 1999; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; 
Prichard and Willmott, 1997).  
 
 
1
 The author wishes to thank the three institutions for the opportunity to study them and the excellent access 
provided. The interpretations presented here are totally those of the investigator and are not intended to make 
value judgements regarding the merits of the strategy processes of any particular institution. Furthermore, this 
study was conducted for the time period 1992 to 1998 and the participating institutions may well have changed 
their personnel and strategy processes since that time. 
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APPENDIX A: Summary of data sources across cases 
 
Data Source Warwick LSE Oxford Brookes 
Interviews 20 open-ended interviews @ 90 minutes each, 
with each TMT member, 2 former members and 2 
non-TMT members. Repeat interviews with 5 
TMT members.   
18 open-ended interviews @ 90 minutes each, 
with each TMT member, 4 APRC members, 4 
senior officers, Director‟s executive assistant, 3 
senior academics, repeat with 2 TMT members. 
11 open-ended interviews @ 90 minutes each, 
with each TMT member, 2 former TMT members, 
Departmental Head, repeat with 2 TMT members. 
Meeting 
observations 
 Strategy Committee – 7  
 Earned Income Group (EIG) - 6 
 Estimates and Grants Committee (E&G) – 5  
 Other working party for actioning a strategic 
issue - 1  
 Academic Planning and Resource Committee 
(APRC) – 7  
 Standing Committee – 2  
 Academic Board – 1  
 Convenors meeting – 1  
 Other administrative and collegial committees 
- 6  
 Vice-Chancellors‟s Advisory Group (VAG) - 
3   
 Board of Governors – 2 
 Planning Process meetings with departments 
– 2  
 Academic Board – 1 
 Other meetings used by TMT for consultative 
purposes - 6 
 Strategy Day between TMT and Board – 1 
Ethnographic  1 week shadowing Senior PVC 
 Pre- and post-meeting observation  
 General on-site data, particularly informal 
discussion when the opportunity arose – at 
least 7 times in detail and many brief chats. 
 Pre- and post-meeting observation 
 General on-site data where I sat in the 
Planning Office, next to the general coffee 
machine; handy for informal discussion, 
which occurred on every visit. 
 1 week shadowing Senior DVC 
 Pre- and post-meeting observation 
 General on-site data, mostly informal chats 
pre and post-meetings and also opportunism; 
being in the right place at the right time.  
Documentary – 
archival and 
other 
 Minutes of Strategy Committee, 1992 to 1998 
 Minutes of all meetings attended 
 Annual reports; Audit documents; Strategic 
plans; Academic databases; University 
calendars; Briefing papers; Memoranda and 
minutes of major 1994 strategic initiative; 
Sectoral documents. 
 Minutes of APRC and Academic Board, 1992 
to 1998 
 Minutes of Standing Committee and Planning 
Team, 1997 to 1998 
 Minutes of all meetings attended 
 Audit documents; Strategic plans; University 
calendars; Briefing papers; Handbook for 
Department Heads; Sectoral documents. 
 Planning Cycle documentation since 
inception in 1995/96 through to 1998/99 
 Major strategic issue reports and summaries 
from 1993 
 Coopers and Lybrand report, 1988 
 Minutes of all meetings attended and minutes 
of strategic-planning VAG Meetings not 
attended. 
 Supporting planning documentation; Annual 
reports and accounts; Sectoral documents. 
 
                                                 
 
